Introduction
Do parents or teachers do a better job assessing potential student performance at a specific age? And who should consequently decide on a child's future education?
Policies related to these questions are heavily discussed in some German states. Underlying these debates about students' level of education are links between human capital accumulation and earnings prospects 1 . In countries where educational tracking is in place, this question typically arises at transition to secondary school 2 . In this paper, we will focus on the track selection practice. Specifically, we are interested in whether free parental choice or binding teacher recommendations lead to a more appropriate allocation of students regarding their academic potential.
Proponents of free parental choice argue that parents know their children best: they have experienced a child's development as well as off-school behaviour. Moreover, parents are said to be more benevolent and put more effort into making the convenient tracking decision. Opponents meanwhile counter parental decision-making to be biased. Wishful thinking combined with selective perception could lead to misestimation of a child's abilities.
Even though teachers might be less informed about the individual child, they would have a broader standard of comparison and be more objective.
Indeed, recent (sociological) literature suggests that teacher recommendations are less prone to background effects 3 . This study compares the effect of binding teacher recommendations and parental choice from an equity point of view.
Our contribution is to evaluate the impact of the decision-maker from an efficiency point of view, i.e. to analyse the effect on students' academic success. Earlier theoretical and empirical literature has focused on the comparison of educational tracking and mixing in general 4 . We focus on one feature of the sorting method, namely the decision-maker who allocates stu-1 An overview is provided by Peracchi [2006] and Heckman et al. [2006] . 2 In Germany for instance, only the highest school track grants university access. 3 e.g. Kleine et al. [2010] 4 For an overview see Meier and Schütz [2007] .
2 dents according to ability. This issue has received considerably less attention so far.
Some studies evaluate parental deviations from teacher recommendations 5 . However, this kind of approach only allows one party to misjudge student potential, i.e. the teachers. In order to incorporate both possibilities, we analyze this problem in the context of a natural experiment setting.
To examine whether parents' or teachers' assessment of the student's potential is more adequate, one needs information on student performance after the tracking decision. We use grade retention rates in 6th and 8th grade as measure.In particular, we will discuss whether the grade retention rate has changed as a result of a reform in 2006 in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). The reform replaced parental choice about children's secondary school type by a binding teacher recommendation.
In order to determine the causal effect of binding teacher recommendations on educational attainment, we use a school data set from the Bureau of Statistics of North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). The data has the following advantage: It comprises several cohorts and grades over a period of four years, i.e. two years before and after the reform. This design allows us to employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy which exploits the policy induced variation. At the same time, it accounts for time consistent differences in retention rates between treated and non-treated cohort-grade combinations.
In addition, the data contain school and grade-level information on the population of all public schools in NRW. We merge this data with information on district characteristics from the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development in Germany (INKAR). This way we can examine determinants of student achievement including some basic background characteristics.
Our study shows that binding teacher recommendations cause less grade retentions. The effect is mainly driven by students from low unemployment and high income districts. This finding may capture that with free parental choice, overambitious parents tend to select too demanding tracks for their children. Since one of the goals of the reform in NRW was to prevent overoptimistic track choices, it may have achieved its aim.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the institutional setting. Section 3 introduces the data. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy, while the main results and their robustness analysis follow in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Institutional setting
Many school systems assign students to various tracks according to academic performance -either by tracking between schools or within schools. Germany is one of the countries where sorting takes place to differing-ability schools 6 .
School system in Germany
The general structure of the German school system is illustrated by figure   1 . It consists of primary and secondary schools which are for the most part tuition-free state schools. First, all children attend primary school (Grundschule) which usually lasts until age 10. Afterwards, the school system's structure becomes tripartite and subdivides into general school 
Grade retention
In Germany, a student faces grade retention if his performance is not sufficient to be promoted to the next grade. The idea behind grade retention is to give the student more time to increase his school achievement, and eventually avoid downgrading into another track. A distinction is drawn between mandatory and voluntary grade retention: Grade retention is mandatory if the student does not meet the formal requirements to be promoted to the next year. The requirements to be promoted are defined in the examination regulations of the state of NRW 13 . They are very similar among the different tracks: in high school and intermediate school for instance, one failed subject needs to be compensated by an equivalent subject with a minimum grade of "satisfactory". In general school, students must not fail two (or more) main subjects as well.
Grade retention is voluntary if the student decides to repeat the grade, regardless of meeting the criteria to be promoted. Typically, voluntary grade retention occurs if the student is close to not meeting the formal requirements.
The rationale is to catch up earlier rather than later 14 .
Data
Our school data set was provided by the Bureau as 2006 and so forth in order to avoid abuse of notation. The data include public schools only. To simplify matters, special needs education is excluded from the analysis. In this paper, we use information on students attending 6th and 8th grade in secondary school.
The data are merged with socio-economic characteristics on NRW's counties from INKAR. They cover the years 2006 to 2009. We use these data as additional independent variables in our analysis and account for the differing levels of aggregation by clustering.
Summary statistics
Student achievement is measured by the ratio of repeating students over the total number of students per grade. Thia so-called retention rate is the dependent variable for our regressions. Tables 2 presents descriptive The former displays the number of students per full-time equivalent teacher.
The latter describes the ratio of the lessons instructed by teachers who possess a teaching certificate for the corresponding subject, to the total lessons taught in the school. This variable can be interpreted in two respects: both how well the school is endowed with teachers from different subjects and how it allocates its resources. In some schools, staffing shortages lead to continued substitution by teachers with no background in the subject. Hence, both variables are a proxy for the quality of teaching. Net income, unemployment rate and share of high skilled 17 are based on district information.
17 High skilled is specified by the share of all college graduated employees which are subject to social insurance contributions over all employees subject to social insurance contributions. A simple differences-in-differences (DiD) regression exploits the policy induced variation to estimate the effect of binding teacher recommendations on student performance. By using this approach, we take into account time consistent differences in retention rates between treatment and control group, as seen in the previous section. Furthermore, DiD considers changes in retention rates over time which similarly affect both groups. Conceivable reasons for these common trends include teachers' attitudes towards retention 19 as well as socio-demographic characteristics. Variations in family background for instance are likely to affect 6th and 8th graders in the same way.
In order to analyse the reform effect, we use the following specification 18 c.f. NRW examination regulations. 19 The effectiveness of grade retention is a controversial topic with mixed empirical evidence. While earlier studies report a negative correlation between class repetition and educational attainment (Jimerson [1999] , Jimerson et al. [2002] ), recent literature accounting for selection bias mostly finds positive or non-significant effects depending on the retention age, e.g. ?, Jacob and Lefgren [2004] and for Germany ? . 
where the subscripts i, c, t represent schools, grades and years, respectively.
The dependent variable retention specifies the ratio of repeating students over total number of students per grade, school and year. treat is an indicator variable taking the value 1 for 6th grade students in school i and year t. i.e. they make sure there is no reform effect in a non-reform year. The latter are incorporated in the manner of Autor [2003] to account for delayed reform effects due to adoption processes.
The vectors Z and X represent grade and school controls, respectively 20 .
20 Since there are multiple grades within one school and every grade can unambiguously Z includes female and migration background. X consists of student-teacherratio, teaching certificate and rural. Macro comprises district characteristics such as net income, unemployment rate and high skilled.
To control for correlated errors and serial correlation, standard errors are clustered within districts 21 .
Policy exogeneity
Serving as a natural experiment, the reform allows us to capture the impact of the sorting method on educational attainment in terms of grade retention.
Since students are assigned to either pre-or post-reform depending on their year of birth, we consider the assignment as being random.
Furthermore, we can rule out that parents react to the anticipated change for the following reasons: First, neither preponing nor postponing of the secondary school transition is of any importance. The former is not relevant because only exceptionally talented students are eligible to skip one grade.
The latter, i.e. postponing via grade retention, will not help circumventing the reform. Second, primary school choice did not alter during the considered time period in NRW, e.g. Schneider et al. [2012] 22 . This is important because primary school choice among families with diverging background characteristics would confound the tracking decision.
We also check feasible confounding influences of the private education sector. The estimates would be biased if the student distribution to private school tracks shifted after the reform. One obvious scenario would be that be attributed to one school, every c can be associated with exactly one i. 21 c.f. Bertrand et al. [2004] . However, Schneider et al. [2012] do not find any effects regarding the amount of school choice and segregation. In addition to the effects of the reform not being significant, we can rely on the fact that we analyse students on the verge of secondary school: the primary school reform in 2008 is more likely to affect the initial primary school choice (1st grade) than to provoke a transfer to another school one year before secondary school transition (4th grade).
children from better educated households selected into private high schools after the reform. To check this hypothesis, we refer to the share of 6th grade students attending private high schools 23 . 
Results
This section presents the results of binding teacher recommendations' impact on mandatory and voluntary grade retention. Mandatory retention is discussed in more detail because it is determined by formal requirements and thus more relevant for our purpose. At the same time, mandatory retention occurs far more often than voluntary retention. One possible interpretation of this finding is that the first cohort is subject to an adaptation process, i.e. the teachers realizing they have the power to decide. From the insignificant leads, it can be seen that the common trend assumption is met.
The effect of binding teacher recommendations on mandatory retention
Specification (2) includes covariates in order to control for unobserved time varying influences, such as migration background or female. The size of the reform effect remains stable and the significance increases to the 1% level.
Our controls have the expected signs. We find that a higher share of female students goes along with less mandatory retentions, c.f. Jacob [2002] and Machin and McNally [2005] . Similarly, more students with migration background are accompanied by higher retention rates. Unsurprisingly, adverse learning environments are correlated to high retention rates: an increase in the student-teacher-ratio leads to a higher retention rate, just as fewer lessons taught from teachers with subject specific education are correlated with more retentions. This goes in line with recent evidence of the teacher-student ra- Angrist and Lavy [1999] . The effects of unemployment rate and net income on mandatory retentions are significant, yet small.
Subgroup estimates
Our estimates so far refer to the average treatment effect of the population.
Not covered in our analysis are heterogeneities in treatment effects across subgroups. This is the case if in some parts of the population, the reform effect is more pronounced than in others. In table 6 and 7, we present evidence for subgroups based on quartiles of unemployment and net income.
The results indicate that the effect stems from subgroups with the lowest unemployment rate or the highest net income in the district. In fact, the size of the effect almost doubles for the subgroup with the lowest unemployment rate. This pattern suggests that binding teacher recommendations reduce mandatory retention primarily for households who are better off. In other words, parents' track choice was overoptimistic (compared to teachers' assess-ment) especially among better situated households. Indeed, overestimating student achievement typically occurs when well-educated parents try to impose their sense of entitlement on their children 24 . As discussed above, one goal of the reform was to prevent overoptimistic track choices by families of comparatively low-achieving students. In this respect, the reform may have achieved its aim.
Pooled results
Another robustness check addresses a potential serial correlation problem in DiD estimation. Bertrand et al. [2004] point out that DiD estimation with numerous time periods causes biased standard errors. One method they propose for solving this problem is aggregating the data into two periods: preand post intervention. Although Bertrand et al. [2004] refer to a survey of papers with 16.5 time periods on average, we give consideration to our data suffering from a serial correlation problem. Hence, we remove the time series dimension by aggregating four years into pre-and post intervention. Table 8 provides evidence that pooled estimation does not change our findings compared to table 6. Teachers' track choice continues to lead to less mandatory retentions in prospering districts.
The effect of binding teacher recommendations on voluntary retention
Results from the voluntary grade retention rate as dependent variable are reported in table 9. Again, we regress retention rates on the reform variables
(1) and include controls (2).
The coefficients prove not to be significant for voluntary retentions. Hence, changing the decision-making unit from parents to teachers does not affect voluntary retention at all. These results are robust to including controls.
As before, the leads are not significant, confirming the common trends assumption. The covariates do not follow the same pattern as with mandatory retention. Although the coefficient estimates of migration background are significant, yet smaller than the values above, the effects of student-teacherratio, female, unemployment rate and net income do not affect voluntary retention. Consequently, the decision process leading to and the determinants of voluntary retention seem to be different from mandatory ones.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we use a school data set to examine the effect of a reform aimed at improving student allocation to different tracks. The reform replaced parental choice regarding the tracking decision by binding teacher recommendations. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we analyse whether teachers' or parents' assessment of students is more reliable in terms of less grade retentions. The results show that binding teacher recommendations cause less retentions. Several robustness checks confirm these findings. The effect is mainly driven by students from districts that are well-off, i.e. characterized by high net income and low unemployment. One interpretation is that with free parental choice, overambitious parents tend to select too demanding tracks for their children. Teacher's choice in contrast seems to provide a more effective selection mechanism. Since one of the goals of the 2006 educational reform in NRW was to prevent overoptimistic track choices, it may have achieved its aim.
In a second paper, we analysed the NRW reform of 2006 regarding the overall distribution of students to various school tracks. We found that the distribution to school tracks barely changed as a result of the reform. In combination with our findings above, this suggests that while the numbers per track remain roughly constant, the composition of students may have changed.
Presumably, the effect of (upward-)binding teacher recommendations would (1) - (4) show the quartiles of average net income, (1) being the subgroup of districts with the lowest average net income. (1) -(4) show the quartiles of unemployment, (1) being the subgroup of districts with the lowest unemployment rate. 
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